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INCORPORATION, PROPERTY OWNERSHIP
AND EQUAL PROTECTION
After the owners of 55% of the assessed value of land within
the proposed city of Rancho Palos Verdes filed a petition objecting to
incorporation, the Board of Supervisors of Los Angeles County dis-
continued incorporation proceedings pursuant to a remonstrance
statute.1 This statute terminates the jurisdiction of the board when
a petition objecting to incorporation is presented by the owners of
51% of the assessed value of the land in the area to be incorporated.
Plaintiffs, representing resident nonproperty owners and owners of
43% of the assessed value of land, sought a writ of mandate to re-
quire the board of supervisors to hold an incorporation election.
Citing an article by Professors Hagman and Disco,2 the Supreme
Court of California in Curtis v. Board of Supervisors," held that
1. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 34311 (Deering Supp. 1972) reads in part:
If upon the final hearing the board of supervisors finds and determines that
written protests to the proposed incorporation have been filed with the
board, signed by qualified signers representing 51% of the total assessed valua-
tion of the land within the boundaries of the proposed incorporation, the
jurisdiction of the board of supervisors shall cease; no election shall be called
and no further petition for the incorporation of any of the same territory shall
be initiated for one year after the date of such determination.
2. Hagman & Disco, One-Man One-Vote as a Constitutional Imperative for
Needed Reform of Incorporation and Boundary Change Laws, 2 URBAN Lmv.
459 (1970).
3. 7 Cal. 3d 942, 501 P.2d 537, 104 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1972). Facts and statutes
relevant to the case: A. City of Rancho Palos Verdes: Area-12.688 sq. miles;
Population-8,885; Land use-primarily single-family housing; Voters--16,763
(over 1,000 of the voters owned no real property); Assessed value of the land-
$66,836,080.00. The two largest property owners owned over $7,000,000 of the
land. The petition for incorporation was signed by 63.6% of the landowners who
owned 42.8% of the assessed land. Protestors owned 55% of the assessed land.
7 Cal. 3d at 950, 501 P.2d at 542, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 302. B. CAL. GOV'T CODE §
34303 (Deering Supp. 1972) reads in part: "Proceedings are initiated by filing
with the board of supervisors at a regular meeting a petition signed by at least
25% of the qualified signers, representing at least 25% of the assessed value of the
land included in the proposed city limits ...." "'Qualified signer' is defined by
§ 34301 as the 'owner of an interest in fee' or the purchaser of land under a writ-
ten agreement to buy. 'Assessed value of the land' for purposes of § 34303 does
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the remonstrance statute violated the equal protection clauses of
both the California 4 and United States Constitutions.5 The court
found that the State, in an incorporation proceeding, had no com-
pelling interest in granting property owners the power to effectively
bar the exercise of the franchise by resident nonproperty owners and
the owners of a minority percentage of the assessed value of land.
The central thesis of those persons who challenged the grant of
exclusive power to property owners to initiate or terminate boundary
change proceedings has been stated as follows:
In California and in many other states of the nation, provisions
for municipal incorporation and for changes in the boundaries
of local jurisdictions are archaic abominations dominated by the
"horse and buggy" concepts of our rural past.... Legislation in
many states still reflects outdated patterns where the property tax
was virtually the sole source of local government revenue and
outdated beliefs that the people in an area, however small, should
have virtually absolute control over their "turf" as demarcated by
city and other local government boundaries.6
After commenting that this language provided a "fitting background"
for the present case, the Curtis court proceeded to test the remon-
strance statute by standards developed to judge legislation challenged
on equal protection grounds. 8 The court examined the statute under
not include the value of improvements. (Krouser v. County of San Bernardino,
29 Cal. 2d 766, 772, 178 P.2d 441, 444 (1947))." 7 Cal. 3d at 948 n.4, 501 P.2d
at 540 n.4, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 300 nA.
4. CAL. CONST. art. I, §§ 11, 21.
5. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
6. Hagman & Disco, supra note 2, at 459 (emphasis added). The authors
question whether property owners should be able to prevent an election by either
failing to initiate or by protesting and terminating the proceedings. Generally,
they suggest that any system, with or without an election provision, whereby
property owners are given the power to control incorporation and boundary
change procedures violates equal protection. They argue that the property tax
is no longer a rational basis for drawing a distinction between land owners,
personal property owners and nonproperty owners. The authors would limit
property owner classifications to situations where the property tax was the sole
source of revenue for the municipality. The underlying philosophy of the authors
is that all persons affected by the incorporation or boundary change should have
a voice in the decision making. Id. at 463-64.
7. 7 Cal. 3d at 946, 501 P.2d at 539, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 299.
8. Id. at 951-52, 501 P.2d at 543-44, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 303-04.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol7/iss1/13
URBAN LAW ANNUAL
1) the "rational relationship" standard, which requires that the classi-
fication be reasonable and bear a substantial relation to the object of
the legislation so that persons similarly situated will be treated alike0
and 2) the more critical "compelling interest" standard, which re-
quires the court to examine the statute more closely when "suspect
criteria" or "fundamental rights" are present.10 Although the court
found that the statute also violated the "rational relationship" test, 1
the court focused primarily on whether there was a compelling in-
terest which justified the statute and whether the distinctions drawn
by the statute were necessary to further its purpose.12
The court felt justified in using the "compelling interest" test since
the effect of the statute was to "touch upon" or burden the right to
9. The basis of the "rational relationship" test is stated in F. S. Royster Guano
Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920): "[T]he classification must be reason-
able, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair
and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons
similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike." This approach has been char-
acterized as involving limited judicial scrutiny, whereby the court recognizes
both the need for reasonable legislative classifications and the paradoxical fact
that the very idea of classifications produces some inequality. See Tussman &
tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 341 (1949). See,
e.g., Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348
U.S. 483 (1955); Daniel v. Family Security Life Ins. Co., 336 U.S. 220 (1949);
Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949); Goesaert v. Cleary,
335 U.S. 464 (1948).
10. In more recent cases beginning with Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535
(1942), the Court has adopted a stricter scrutiny of state legislation and has
required the state to show a compelling interest when the legislative classification
is viewed as involving "suspect criteria" based on race or wealth and "funda-
mental rights," including the right to vote and the right to travel. Under this
approach, the reasonableness of the statute is not presumed unless the state can
show compelling reasons for the classification. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson,
394 U.S. 618 (1969); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968); Levy v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S.
663 (1966). See also Karst & Horowitz, Reitman v. Mulkey: A Telophase of
Substantive Equal Protection, 1967 SuP. CT. Ruv. 39; Developments in the Law
-Equal Protection, 82 HAnv. L. REv. 1065, 1077-1132 (1969).
Criticism of the "compelling interest" standard centers on the view that the
equal protection clause requires only that the classification be based on some
rational legislative objective and that the clause has never required equal treat-
ment of all persons despite differing circumstances. The basic concern of the
critics is to prevent the judiciary from making arbitrary decisions and to preserve
the legislature as the instrument of social change. See Justice Harlan's dissents
in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 655 (1969), and Harper v. Virginia Bd.
of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 680 (1966).
11. 7 Cal. 3d at 963, 501 P.2d at 551-52, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 311-12.
12. Id. at 951-52, 501 P.2d at 544, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 304.
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vote.1 3 Although the challenged statute did not contain an election
provision, incorporation was predicated upon approval by the residents
in the area to be incorporated."4 The court determined that the statute
delegated the power to forestall the election without providing stand-
ards for decision making and without including other groups who
had equally important political and financial interests.' 5 Specifically,
the court noted the statute's threefold distinction: "Between those
who own land and those who do not. Between those who own more
valuable land, and those owning less valuable parcels. Between owners
of unimproved land as against owners of improved land."'i6 The court
stated as a general proposition,
[T]hat all residents share a substantial interest in the government
of their state, city, county, school district, and other agencies of
general governmental power, and in the issuance of bonds by
these entities. Consequently the special concern of the landowners
as to the level of taxes upon real property cannot justify exclusion
of the nonlandowner nor the proportionate reduction of the vote
of owners of less valuable property."
To arrive at this result the court felt compelled to distinguish
Adams v. City of Colorado Springs," where a federal district court
upheld a state statute which allowed a city to annex unilaterally,
without an election, land which was two-thirds contiguous with the
city, but provided for an election where the land was less than two-
thirds contiguous. The Curtis court noted that even though the con-
tested grant of power was to the landowners and not to the city, as
in Adams, it was immaterial that the grant of power to bar exercise
of the franchise, not the franchise itself, was at issue.' 9
The holding in Curtis challenges some of the traditional concepts
concerning the creation and change of municipal boundaries.20 The
California court has expanded the scope of equal protection to in-
clude classifications based on property ownership which give property
owners the power to effectively deny others the right to vote in an
13. Id. at 953, 501 P.2d at 544, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 304.
14. Id. at 954, 501 P.2d at 545, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 305.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 960, 501 P.2d at 549, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 309.
18. 308 F. Supp. 1397 (D. Colo.), aff'd, 399 U.S. 901 (1970).
19. 7 Cal. 3d at 955 n.17, 501 P.2d at 546 n.17, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 306 n.17.
20. Id. at 954, 501 P.2d at 545, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 305.
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incorporation proceeding. The question remains, however, whether
the logic and rationale of the Curtis opinion is valid and can be
applied to other statutes governing incorporation and boundary
change which grant power according to property ownership classi-
fications.
I. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT
Many courts, when interpreting statutes governing the incorpora.
tion of municipalities or changes in their boundaries, rely on the con-
cept that municipal corporations are creatures of the state which can
be fashioned or altered at will,21 and that boundary change procedures
are not subject to judicial review.2 2 Especially in the case of annexa-
tion, the attitude is prevalent that the issue is strictly political and
requires legislative determination 23 rather than the consent of the
persons affected.2 4 The United States Supreme Court has become in-
creasingly aware, however, that fundamental rights may be involved
in the setting of municipal boundaries and that such procedures
should be subject to judicial review.25 Competing both with the legis-
lature's exclusive control over municipal incorporation and boundary
change and with notions of equality are the traditionally vested rights
and powers of the owners of property.2 6
21. See, e.g., Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161 (1907), wherein
the Court stated:
Municipal corporations are political subdivisions of the state, created as
convenient agencies for exercising such of the governmental powers of the
state as may be entrusted to them. For the purpose of executing these powers
properly and efficiently they usually are given the power to acquire, hold,
and manage personal and real property. The number, nature, and duration
of the powers conferred upon these corporations and the territory over which
they shall be exercised rests in the absolute discretion of the state. . . . The
state, therefore, at its pleasure may modify or withdraw all such powers,
may take without compensation such property, hold it itself, or vest it in
other agencies, expand or contract the territorial area, unite the whole or a
part of it with another municipality, repeal the charter and destroy the
corporation. All this may be done, conditionally or unconditionally, with or
without the consent of the citizens, or even against their protest.
Id. at 178-79.
22. Deane Hill Country Club, Inc. v. City of Knoxville, 379 F.2d 321 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 975 (1967); Detroit Edison Co. v. East China
Township School Dist. No. 3, 247 F. Supp. 296 (E.D. Mich. 1965), afJ'd, 378
F.2d 225 (6th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 932 (1967).
23. 2 E. MCQUtILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 7.10, at 309 (3d ed. 1966).
24. Id. § 7.14, at 332.
25. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
26. 1 F. THORPE, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AxERICAN PEOPLE,
1776-1850, 92-98 (1898); C. WLIAMSON, AMERICAN SUFFRAOE FROM6 PROPERTY
To DEMOCRAcy, 1760-1860 (1960).
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The standard rationale for giving property owners predominant, if
not exclusive, control of the decision-making process in municipal
incorporation and boundary change situations is that property owners
are primarily interested in the outcome and will ultimately bear the
burden of municipal costs through payment of property taxes.27 The
argument that classifications based on property ownership are rational
and reasonable finds support in Justice Harlan's dissent in Harper v.
Virginia Board of Elections,28 where he noted that property qualifica-
tions have been a traditional part of our political structure and have
gradually changed only as theories of political representation have
changed.29 Although such classifications may not conform to popular
notions of an egalitarian society, Justice Harlan concluded that there
is arguably a rational basis for these classifications. 30
The rationale supporting property owner classifications has been
increasingly challenged, both as a matter of political theory-i and
economic reality.32 An indication of the changing attitude towards
classifications based on property ownership is seen in the Supreme
Court's decision in Turner v. Fouche,33 where the Court held that a
27. Hagman & Disco, supra note 2, at 464.
28. 383 U.S. 663, 680-86 (1965).
29. Id. at 684.
30. He stated:
It is also arguable, indeed it was probably accepted as sound political theory
by a large percentage of Americans through most of our history, that people
with some property have a deeper stake in community affairs, and are con-
sequently more responsible, more educated, more knowledgeable, more worthy
of confidence, than those without means, and that the community and Nation
would be better managed if the franchise were restricted to such citizens.
Id. at 685.
31. McBain, Law-Making by Property Owners, 36 PoL. SoC. Q. 617, 641(1921).
32. Hagman & Disco, supra note 2, at 464, citing 5 U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
CENSUS OF GOVERNMENTS 9 (1967), state that: "In the nation, considering all
forms of local government in Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas, the average
government in those areas receive only 44.6 per cent of its revenue from property
taxes, and received 32.4 per cent of its revenue by way of inter-governmental trans-
fers from the state or federal governments." Note, however, that the above figures
reflect only the average SMSA income from the property tax. When broken down
according to size groupings, income received from property taxes reaches as
high as 50.4% for areas with populations of 50,000 to 99,000, while income from
inter-governmental transfers was only 28.8%. Id. These statistics raise the general
question of what percentage of its revenue derived from property taxes should a
municipality have in order to make classifications based on property ownership
unreasonable or arbitrary.
33. 396 U.S. 346 (1970).
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Georgia statute requiring members of the county board of education
to be "freeholders," denied equal protection to non-landowning resi-
dents of the county.3 4 The thrust of the Court's argument was that
property ownership did not determine responsibility or the ability to
participate intelligently in educational decisions.35
Other recent United States Supreme Court decisions concerning
property ownership restrictions on voting in municipal bond elections
were crucial to the analysis developed by the Curtis court. The Court
held unconstitutional a New York statute which limited the right to
vote in school board elections to owners and lessees of real property
and parents of school-age children, on the grounds that the State had
no compelling interest in denying the franchise to a resident of the
school district who was a taxpayer and interested in and affected by
school board decisions. 0 Similarly, the Court invalidated a statute
which allowed only property owners to vote on the issuance of revenue
bonds by a municipal utility.3 7 Also, the Court has found that, even
in the case of general obligation bonds, the requirements of equal
protection were violated when the vote was limited to property
owners because "property owners and nonproperty owners alike have
a substantial interest in the public facilities and the services available
in the city and will be substantially affected by the ultimate outcome
of the bond election at issue in this case." 38
Although the Curtis court could have argued on the basis of the
above cited cases that both property and nonproperty owners alike
34. Id. at 364.
35. Id. at 363-64.
36. Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
37. Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969). The Court concluded
that while the franchise, in certain elections, could be limited to persons who
were "specially interested," here the benefits and burdens of the revenue bonds
fell on property and non-property owners indiscriminately. Id. at 705.
38. City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204, 209 (1970). The Court
also noted that the ultimate burden for property taxes will fall on tenants in the
form of increased rents and not upon the property owners. Id. at 210. See Stewart
v. Parish School Bd., 310 F. Supp. 1172 (E.D. La.), aff'd, 400 U.S. 884 (1970),
where the federal district court held unconstitutional a Louisiana statute which
limited the franchise in school bond elections to landowners and allocated votes
on the basis of assessed value of property. The court noted that: "It is not enough
to show that included groups have an interest. It must be shown that the ex-
clusions are necessary to promote a compelling state interest. In terms of voting
responsibly, there is no necessary correlation between the amount of an assess-
ment and the degree of interest a taxpayer may have in a particular bond issue."
Id. at 1179.
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would bear the burden of paying for municipal services, the chal-
lenged statute did not directly prohibit nonproperty owners from
voting. The court solved this problem by carrying the equal protection
analysis one step further to include a statute which burdened the right
to vote by giving property owners the ability to prevent an election
altogether.3 9 Furthermore, the court felt that it was unnecessary to
decide whether the remonstrance procedure constituted an "election"
for equal protection purposes. 40
II. COMPARABLE CASES AND STATUTES
In the context of annexation, there are statutes giving the right to
frustrate annexation proceedings unless the petition is signed by
owners of all of the land in the area to be annexed,4' by owners of
one-half of the real and personal property,42 or by both a majority of
the owners of land and a majority of the resident electors. 43 Indiana
statutes permit annexation proceedings to be initiated by a petition
signed by 51% of the owners of land in territory sought to be
annexed. .4 A companion statute permits an appeal to be taken
"[F]rom the annexation by either a majority of the owners of land in
the territory or by the owners of more than seventy-five per cent
(75%) in assessed valuation of the real estate in the territory, if they
deem themselves aggrieved or injuriously affected .. ."45 Based on
these statutes the Supreme Court of Indiana has reached an opposite
result from the court in Curtis.
'9. 7 Cal. 3d at 955, 501 P.2d at 546, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 306.
40. Id. at 953, 501 P.2d at 544, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 304.
41. GA. CODE ANN. § 69-902 (Supp. 1972).
42. ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9-471 (1956).
43. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 24, § 7-1-2 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1973). "The petition
must be signed, not only by a majority of legal voters in the territory, but also
by a majority of property owners therein, whether they live in the territory and
are entitled to vote therein or not." People ex rel. Metz v. City of St. Elmo, 306
II1. 168, 137 N.E. 459 (1922).
All petitions shall be supported by an affidavit of one or more of the peti-
tioners, or someone on their behalf, that the signatures on the petition rep-
resent a majority of the property owners of record and the owners of record
of more than 50% of land in the territory described and a majority of the
electors of the territory therein described.... If the court finds that (1) the
annexation petition is not signed by the requisite number of electors or prop-
erty owners of record . ..the court shall dismiss the petition or ordinance,
as the case may be.
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 24, § 7-1-4 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1973).
44. IND. ANN. STAT. § 48-720 (Supp. 1972).
45. Id. § 48-721.
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In Forks v. City of Warsaw,46 plaintiffs, who did not own any real
property in the area to be annexed, but who owned mobile homes
and other tangible and intangible personal property, sought to chal-
lenge the remonstrance statute on the grounds of equal protection.
The Supreme Court of Indiana premised its decision by commenting
"Inasmuch as the legislature may provide for the annexation of terri-
tory to municipal corporations without the consent of the inhabitants
of the annexed territory, the inhabitants cannot complain of any
limitation upon their ability to express their disapproval if the legisla-
ture sees fit to make the statute conditional upon its acceptance by
the affected territory."47 Using the "rational relationship" equal pro-
tection test and avoiding mention of recent United States Supreme
Court decisions concerning equal protection, the Indiana court fol-
lowed the traditional argument in disposing of plaintiffs' equal pro-
tection claim. The Court stated that even though all residents of the
territory are affected by the annexation, the legislative classification is
reasonable since non-landowners are more likely to be temporary resi-
dents while persons who do own land have a permanent investment
which cannot be removed.48 The primary difference found to justify
the classification, however, was in the distinction between the right to
remonstrate against an annexation and the right to vote in an elec-
tion.49
In the incorporation context there are statutes which give property
owners the power to prevent municipal incorporation. Indiana pres-
ently has a remonstrance statute which allows either 51% of the own-
ers of a fee simple in real property or the owners of 75% in assessed
value of real estate in the affected area to petition and stop the in-
46. -Ind.-, 273 N.E.2d 856 (1971), cert. denied, 93 S. Ct. 39 (1972). See
also Montagano v. City of Elkhart, -Ind. App.-, 271 N.E.2d 475 (1971).
47. -Ind. at-, 273 N.E.2d at 859.
48. Id. at-, 273 N.E.2d at 858.
49. The court stated:
In a referendum the question is submitted to the entire voting public for a
choice. The purpose of a remonstrance is to afford the opportunity to any
person seeking to object to the proposed action of a body politic by taking the
affirmative step to register their objection. We, therefore, hold that the right
to remonstrate as provided by the statute in question is not an election to the
extent that all voters in the community must be afforded the opportunity to
participate.
Id. at-, 273 N.E.2d at 859.
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corporation proceedings.5 The distinctions drawn by this statute are
similar to those in Curtis. The difference is that Indiana does not
provide for an election to determine the incorporation issue, but
rather, incorporation is either permitted or denied on the basis of a
hearing by commissioners. 5x
Other state statutes give property owners the power to initiate
incorporation proceedings. Louisiana permits 25% of the resident
electors of an area who own 25% of the assessed value of property
to initiate incorporation proceedings. 2 Alabama requires that the
owners of 60% of the acreage within the territory to be incorporated
give their consent together with a number of resident electors.r3
New York permits initiation of incorporation proceedings in an
alternative fashion: either a specified percentage of the owners of
real property may petition and/or the owners of a specified per-
centage of the assessed value of real property may petition.4 Although
there is a shift in focus at this point from remonstrance to initiation
of incorporation proceedings, many of the arguments presented in
Curtis could logically be applied if the court was correct in saying
that a classification based on property ownership is no longer reason-
ably related to the purposes of an incorporation statute. The statutory
grant of power to property owners to initiate incorporation proceed-
ings was not raised as an issue by plaintiffs, but the Curtis court
served warning that such a statute may also violate equal protection
concepts if nonproperty owners were not also given the same right to
act.15
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court of Indiana's holding that a remonstrance is not
equivalent to an election in weighing equal protection claims and that
the legislature may make a rational distinction between property and
50. IND. ANN. STAT. § 48-136 (Supp. 1972).
51. Id. § 48-135.
52. LA. Rnv. STAT. ANN. 1 33:52 (Supp. 1973). In Stein v. Town of Lafitte,
266 So. 2d 516 (La. App. 1972), plaintiffs alleged that this statute denied equal
protection since it allowed the will of a minority to impose itself on the majority.
The court refused to discuss the constitutional question, but held for plaintiffs
on the ground that the petition was defective.
53. ALA. CoDE tit. 37, § 10 (Supp. 1971).
54. N.Y. VILLAGE LAw § 2-202(1) (a) (McKinney Supp. 1971).
55. 7 Cal. 3d at 964 n.30, 501 P.2d at 553 n.30, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 313 n.30.
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nonproperty owners in incorporation and annexation proceedings is
contrary to the Supreme Court of California's conclusion that all per-
sons are affected by and have an interest in these decisions. The differ-
ence in the holdings of the California and Indiana courts reflects not
only a difference in philosophy concerning the reasonableness of a leg-
islative classification based on property ownership, but also a difference
in the scope and application of equal protection in municipal incor-
poration and boundary change proceedings.
If the Curtis court was correct in its conclusion that a classification
based on property ownership is no longer reasonable in incorporation
and boundary change questions where the action or inaction of prop-
erty owners can effectively prevent the final determination of the
issue in a general election, then the rationale of the opinion could
logically be extended to include statutes which give the power to
initiate or to terminate such proceedings whether or not the statute is
coupled with an election provision. If the Supreme Court of Indiana
was correct, however, in its view that a legislature may rationally dis-
tinguish between property and nonproperty owners, then statutes
which make this distinction do not violate equal protection concepts.
While the view of the Curtis court seems to follow modern concepts
of municipal planningo and egalitarian democracy, the view of the
Indiana court is supported by the argument of Justice Harlan that
even though such classifications may not be currently popular, they
are at least not unreasonable and should be eliminated by the legisla-
ture and not by the courts.57
John G. Vogel, Jr.
56. See Mandelker, Standards for Municipal Incorporations on the Urban
Fringe, 36 TExAs L. Rav. 269 (1958).
57. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 686 (1966) (dissenting
opinion).
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